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Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Omaha, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, MN , bu. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
*
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82.50
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
*
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125.00
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture,
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47.00
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Discussions on the appropriate regulatory norms for
biotech or genetically modified (GM) foods date back to the
early 1980s. Twenty-five years later, a consensus on what
such norms should be remains elusive. While the safety of
GM foods prior to their commercialization is evaluated
through, more or less, the same methods around the world,
countries differ widely on their treatment of GM foods that
have been deemed safe for market introduction. Some
countries, including the United States and Canada consider
these GM foods substantially equivalent to their
conventional counterparts, and do not require segregation
and labeling of these products. Others, including the
European Union (EU), Japan, South Korea, New Zealand,
Australia and China have introduced mandatory labeling
regimes.
Not all mandatory labeling laws for GM foods are
“created equal” however, as they differ substantially in
their standards. For instance, the EU requires mandatory
labeling of all food ingredients, additives and flavorings,
animal feeds and feed additives as well as highly processed
foods (such as refined oils) that contain more than 0.9
percent GM material. Other countries have more liberal
laws. Japan and South Korea, for instance, mandate
labeling for food products that contain major ingredients
with more than five and two percent of GM material,
respectively, while they exclude animal feeds, highly
processed foods and oils from labeling requirements.
Mandatory labeling laws allow for the presence of GM
material in non-GM food to cope with perfect segregation
and purity of non-GM food being costly and often not
practically feasible. Purity standards are typically set up in
terms of tolerances or purity thresholds, defining the
amount of GM material that triggers labeling of a product
as “GM.” Since the GM content allowed in non-GM food
is generally meant to be “accidental and unavoidable,”
these purity thresholds are often referred to as “adventitious
presence,” or AP thresholds.
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While most mandatory labeling regimes include AP
thresholds, the establishment of these thresholds has
generally been an arduous process. Consider the EU
experience, for instance. Even though the EU introduced
mandatory labeling for Genetically Modified Organisms
(GMOs), and food derived from GMOs in 1997, it took
two more years to set the purity threshold at one percent.
Then in 2001, the EU Commission adopted two new
legislative proposals that sought to extend mandatory
labeling to animal feeds and feed additives, as well as
highly refined oils, sugars and starches. Purity thresholds
were revisited, and after two years of contentious
deliberation they were set at their current level of 0.9
percent. Since that time, EU regulators have sought to put
the last piece of their GM regulatory framework in place
by establishing purity thresholds for conventional planting
seeds. Once again, the process has been highly
contentious, with some interest groups calling for
thresholds set at the level of detectability, typically 0.1
percent, and others advocating higher thresholds that
would presumably minimize disruptions in the agri-food
supply chain, typically 0.5 percent or more. The EU
Commission has attempted to find the “middle ground” –
discussing thresholds between 0.3 and 0.5 percent – with
little success.
Although the differences in these purity standards
seem minute, they have caused strong disagreements.
While the underlying causes of discord seem to be rooted,
at least in part, in trade and political considerations, little
is known about the market and welfare implications of
different purity thresholds. What recent research has
shown is that purity thresholds impact the production and
segregation costs in non-GM supply channels (cost effect),
as well as the consumer valuation of non-GM foods (utility
effect).
In a study published in the Journal of Agricultural and
Food Industrial Organization (Giannakas, et al., 2011), we
seek to analyze the market and welfare effects of purity
thresholds for non-GM foods subject to such thresholds. In
particular, the analysis focuses on the effect of allowing
the presence of GM material in non-GM foods on the
prices and quantities of the GM and non-GM products, the
profits of the product suppliers and consumer welfare.
Our analysis shows that the cost and utility effects of
increased AP thresholds reduce the price of non-GM
products and have an effect on the equilibrium price of
GM products, the quantities of GM and non-GM products
and the welfare of the groups involved. The market and
welfare effects of increased AP thresholds are shown to be
case-specific and dependent on the relative magnitude of
the cost and utility effects; the distribution of consumer
preferences and the level of aversion to GM products; the
production, processing and marketing costs along the GM
and non-GM supply chains; the segregation and labeling
costs of the two products; and the market power present in
the supply channels of the GM and non-GM products. It is

important to note that an “as low as technically possible”
threshold does not necessarily correspond to maximum
consumer welfare. In fact, our analysis suggests that under
certain circumstances it is possible to improve the welfare
of all GM and non-GM product consumers through a more
liberal AP threshold for non-GM foods.
In addition to identifying the effect of purity standards
on prices, quantities and the welfare of the groups involved,
the analysis shows that a change in the AP threshold can
create winners and losers not only among the consumers,
but also among the suppliers of the two products. The
identity of these winners and losers is determined by the
relative cost and utility effects. For instance, while an
increase in the AP threshold under a low cost effect and a
high utility effect results in benefits for suppliers of GM
products and losses for consumers of GM and non-GM
products and suppliers of non-GM products, the same
reduction under a high cost effect and a low utility effect
has the exact opposite outcome for the interest groups
involved.
These results have important implications for policy
design and the political economy of AP thresholds. The
existence of nonlinearities in the cost and utility effects of
purity thresholds imply that, at low AP thresholds, even
small changes in these thresholds could have large welfare
and distributional effects. The results can then help explain
the strong disagreements that have been observed in EU
negotiations for seemingly minute shifts in AP thresholds.
In general, potential winners and losers from regulatory
changes in AP thresholds should be expected to politically
position themselves in order to serve their interests. Our
analysis can be utilized to provide insights on the position
of the different groups in negotiations about AP thresholds
and the political economy of setting these thresholds. A key
finding of our analysis is that the very same group could
either support or oppose an increase in AP thresholds,
depending on the particular market conditions (that
determine whether such increase would lead to gains or
losses). Our results can, therefore, provide some
rationalization of seemingly “irrational” behaviors in the
marketplace.
Consider the organic markets in the EU and the U.S.,
for instance. Until recently, EU regulations prohibited the
presence of GM material in organic products requiring
these products to be GM free. With low segregation costs
(due to a negligible domestic GM production) and high
expressed consumer aversion to GM foods, our analysis
suggests that European consumers and producers of organic
products should have no interest in increased AP thresholds.1 This may explain why Council Regulation No. 834/
1

The low segregation costs and the high European consumer aversion to
GM products suggest that the utility effect of increased AP thresholds
dominates the cost effect in the EU. In such a case, our analysis reveals
that increased AP thresholds result in losses for the consumers and
producers of non-GM products.

2007, allowing products with up to 0.9 percent GM
content to be labeled as “organic,” while intending “to
reduce the segregation and identity preservation costs
incurred by the organic sector,” resulted in an outcry by
the European organic industry.
Conversely, with relatively higher production and
segregation costs (due to a widespread adoption of GM
crops and a significant domestic GM production), and
considerably lower consumer aversion to GM products,
the cost effect of increased AP thresholds should dominate
the utility effect in the U.S. Our analysis then indicates
that, unlike their European counterparts, American consumers and organic producers should not favor a zero AP
threshold policy. The position of the Organic Trade
Association (OTA), which is a membership-based association for the organic industry in North America, reads:
“OTA rejects a zero-tolerance policy at this time, on the
grounds that obtaining a zero level of GMOs may not be
possible in the U.S., due to widespread contamination.” In
fact, “OTA does not support setting any tolerance level” as
“organic production is a process guarantee” which is
consistent with the current U.S. policy on organics.
In closing, it is important to reiterate the significance
of purity thresholds in labeling and coexistence of GM and
non-GM foods. Purity thresholds define what a “non-GM”
food is; they influence its costs of production, segregation
and distribution; they impact consumer willingness-to-pay
for non-GM foods; they influence the share of GM and
non-GM foods in the market place; and they ultimately
affect prices and welfare. Given the prevalence and
importance of purity thresholds, it is surprising how little
research exists on their market and welfare effects. Our
study makes some progress in this direction and provides
useful insights for understanding the behavior of
stakeholder groups in policy negotiations.

Our results also point to particular directions where
additional research is needed. Since the market and welfare
effects of purity thresholds have been shown to depend on
the relative magnitude of their cost and utility effects,
reliable estimates of these cost and utility effects would be
of paramount significance for the interest groups involved.
They are also essential for the design of a solid economic
policy on GM food labeling standards.
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